Since hash proof system (HPS) can be utilized to build versatilely cryptographic schemes, the study on realizing this cryptographic primitive has been a very active research area. With the increasing concerns on the huge progress in quantum computing, it urges cryptographers to explore the existence of quantum-resistant HPS schemes, such as the one relying on some lattice-based assumptions. However, most lattice-based HPS proposals are relatively inefficient (e.g., simply outputting one-bit key), even though lattice-based schemes can enjoy many advantageous features: worst-case to average-case reduction, resistance so far to quantum algorithms, and good asymptotic efficiency. Therefore, efficient HPS schemes based on lattice problems are deeply in demand. Through a comprehensive analysis, we found that some lattice-based HPS schemes can be rephrased as their corresponding key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) forms, which generally rely on diverse reconciliation mechanisms and directly imply key exchange protocols under lattice-based assumptions. In this paper, inspired by a novel reconciliation mechanism based on the learning with errors (LWE) problem, we first properly adapt this LWE-based reconciliation mechanism for arbitrary modulus. Then using this improved reconciliation mechanism, we propose an efficient LWE-based HPS scheme which can generate multiple encapsulated key bits and perform better in both computation and storage costs than other related results. Moreover, our proposed lattice-based HPS scheme can be also extended to identity-based and updatable settings for demonstrating its diverse applications.
I. INTRODUCTION
The notion of hash proof system (HPS) was first proposed by Cramer and Shoup [1] in order to achieve indistinguishability against chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) security from indistinguishability against chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA) encryption schemes. It consists of two basic components, i.e., subset membership problems and projective hash family. Subset membership problem specifies that given a finite non-empty set X and a language L ⊆ X , it is (computationally) hard to distinguish the distributions between L and L = X \ L. In addition, for any arbitrary element x ∈ L, The associate editor coordinating the review of this manuscript and approving it for publication was Rasheed Hussain. there exists a witness w such that (x, w) satisfies a certain binary relationship. Projective hash family is typically specified by two properties: projection and smoothness. The projection property means that there are two hash functions H pk and H sk mapping set X to some set, where the public key pk is a projection of secret key sk. For any element x in the language L ⊆ X , we have H sk (x) = H pk (x, w), where w is a witness of x ∈ L. Whereas for any x in L = X \ L, such a witness does not exist. The smoothness property means that H sk (x) is independent of pk, i.e., the distribution of H sk (x) is uniformly random even given pk and x.
Essentially, HPS can be viewed as a special non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for a language. Specifically, if it is hard to distinguish elements of the special subset L VOLUME 7, 2019 This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License. For more information, see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ from non-elements, then this HPS can be seen as a kind of implicit designated-verifier (with sk) proof system for membership in the special subset. In addition, the noninteraction property consists in the scenario that the verifier which generates secret key sk and projection key pk, would publish pk in a broadcast way. This pk can be seen as a common reference string between any potential prover and this verifier. Thus, at some point, a prover would like to prove his statement about x ∈ L to the verifier. The prover only needs to make a mono-directional interaction from him to the verifier for finishing the proof. Due to this special property, HPS has been widely used to develop other cryptographic schemes, such as password-based authenticated key exchange [2] , oblivious transfer [3] , extractable commitment [4] , lossy trapdoor functions [5] , leakage-resilient public-key encryption [6] , privacy-preserving interactive protocols [7] , and cryptographic reverse firewall [8] .
As known to all, with the huge threat from quantum computing, cryptographers tend to focus on developing post-quantum cryptographic schemes. Moreover, this transition to post-quantum cryptographic standards which can offer quantum resistance has been put into agenda by some official agencies, including the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [9] , the National Security Agency (NSA) [10] , and the PQCRYPTO project [11] funded by the European Union. During the course of developing post-quantum schemes (e.g., encryption, signature, and key exchange), lattice-based cryptography [12] has drawn much attentions since it enjoys several advantages, such as the worst-case to the average-case hardness reduction, higher asymptotic efficiency, and the resistance so far to quantum attacks.
A. RELATED WORK
Although HPS schemes based on various classical assumptions (such as Decisional Diffie-Hellman, Decision Residuosity, Quadratic Residuosity, and N-Residuosity assumptions) are relatively well understood, the study on lattice setting is still far behind. Inspired by the work of Gennaro and Lindell [13] , Katz and Vaikuntanathan proposed the first lattice-based HPS [2] in the standard model. A subsequent work proposed by Lai et al. presented a more simpler and efficient lattice-based HPS scheme [14] . However, these two schemes both achieve approximate correctness. Afterwards, Benhamouda et al. presented the first word-independent (i.e., the projection key does not depend on the ciphertext) HPS scheme [15] in the standard lattice setting, and showed that how to amplify the approximate correctness into a statistical one. However, these three proposals can simply output one single key bit.
As a main line of applications, HPS schemes are developed to build password-based authentications key change protocols [2] , [13] , [16] - [20] , where the length of hash values would decide the length of final exchanged keys. As we know, most of HPS constructions focus on single bit hash value output, though they can be amortized in the concatenation way to achieve multi-bit computation. Unfortunately, this straightforward construction for multi-bit HPS will not lead to the best performance. Even in the latest HPS scheme [15] , they claim that to extend their techniques in the ring-setting for producing O(n)-bit hash values is still an open question. Therefore, an efficient HPS scheme with multi-bit key output would be needed for some efficiency concerns, especially in using HPS to build key exchange protocols or other cryptographic schemes.
B. MOTIVATION
As far as we know, there already exist several efficient lattice-based key exchanges protocols [21] - [24] . In general, the correctness of these protocols relies on different reconciliation mechanisms, which can be generalized as a key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) form. That is, if we assume that there are two involved participants Alice and Bob. Bob first encapsulates the final session key using Alice's public key and his own secret key, and sends Alice the ciphertext of this encapsulated key with some signal information. Then Alice can recover the encapsulated key using the received messages with her secret key. Moreover, in the work of Hofheinz and Kiltz [25] , they claimed that a computational variant of HPS can directly imply a secure KEM. Therefore, we know that some key exchange protocols and HPS schemes in the lattice setting can both rely on a key technique, i.e., ''reconciliation mechanism'', since we can somehow rephrase them as a KEM form.
Inspired by an efficient LWE-based HPS scheme in [14] , we found that the rationale behind this scheme is very similar to the LWE-based version of reconciliation mechanism proposed in [26] , but it simply outputs a single key bit from each entry of key material matrix. However, a latticebased key exchange protocol (called Frodo) shown in [24] relies on an improved LWE-based reconciliation mechanism version of [26] , which can extract B-bit from each entry. Thus, we would like to improve the lattice-based HPS scheme of [14] to make it output multiple key bits in the end. Actually, this can be done by simply sampling several intermediate vectors (all indexed by i) independently for all i ∈ [B], and then using them in B independent executions of this HPS scheme to complete the task. However, this very straightforward way will result in heavy overhead due to some additional Gaussian sampling and necessary computation operations. Thus, we suppose that if the reconciliation mechanism of [24] can be applied to the lattice-based HPS scheme in [14] , then the obtained HPS scheme can achieve a better performance when comparing with other related works. However, it is often desirable to set modulus as a sufficiently large prime for efficiency and security reasons in the lattice setting. This is the exact case where the lattice-based HPS scheme of [14] requires an odd prime modulus. But the LWE-based key exchange protocol presented in [24] is only made for a power of two modulus. 
C. CONTRIBUTIONS
Therefore, in this paper we first extend the reconciliation mechanism of [24] for arbitrary modulus, thus directly achieving an extended LWE-based key exchange protocol. Then we apply this extended reconciliation mechanism to improving the LWE-based HPS scheme proposed in [14] , where it requires an odd prime modulus for a better performance. Note that the efficiency analysis of our proposal can be found in Table 1 to show our progress. In addition, we propose two extensions of this improved HPS in two different settings, i.e., an identity-based HPS (IB-HPS) and an updatable HPS (UHPS).
D. ROADMAP
In the rest of this paper, we first introduce some notations and related backgrounds in Section II. Then we extend the reconciliation mechanism of [24] in Section III, thus achieving an LWE-based key exchange for arbitrary modulus. In Section IV, we apply this extended reconciliation mechanism to an LWE-based HPS scheme [14] for improving efficiency. In Section V, we propose two extensions of this improved HPS scheme for realizing HPS in identity-based and updatable settings, respectively. In the end of this paper, we draw a conclusion and show some future works in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first introduce some notations (see Section II-A) throughout this paper. Then we present some necessary backgrounds about lattices (see Section II-B), the LWE problem (see Section II-C), and HPS (see Section II-D). Furthermore, in Section II-E, we recall some existing lemmas which will help us to complete some proofs we made in this paper.
A. NOTATIONS
For any x, y ∈ R with y > 0, x denotes the largest integer not greater than x, then x = x + 1/2 and x mod y = x − x/y y. For any n ∈ N, [n] represents a set {1, . . . , n}. For an integer q ≥ 1, Z q denotes the quotient ring Z/qZ. We let |S| denote the size of any set S. We denote log as the logarithm to the base 2. We use bold lowercase letters to denote column vectors, e.g., v, and bold capital letters to denote matrices, e.g., M. The notation v T represents the transpose of column vector v. For a vector v, its Euclidean norm (i.e., 2 norm) is defined as v = ( i v 2 i ) 1/2 . For a matrix M, its Euclidean norm is the 2 norm of its longest column, i.e., M = max i m i , where m i is the i-th column vector of M.
Throughout this paper, we let n ∈ N denote a security parameter which is taken as an implicit input to all other quantities. We classify the growth of functions by using standard asymptotic notation. Let f (n) and g(n) be two positive functions. We say f (n) = O(g(n)) if there exist two fixed positive constants c and n 0 such that f (n) ≤ cg(n) for all n ≥ n 0 , and f (n) = o(g(n)) if for any arbitrarily positive constant c, there exists a positive constant n 0 such that f (n) ≤ cg(n) for all n ≥ n 0 . We say that f (n) =Õ(g(n)) if f (n) = O(g(n) log c g(n)) for some fixed constant c. Let poly(n) denote an unspecified function f (n) = O(n c ) for some constant c. We let negl(n) denote a function f (n) negligible in n such that f (n) = o(n −c ) for any constant c. We say that an event happens with overwhelming probability if it happens with probability at least 1 − negl(n).
If D is a probability distribution over a set S, then x ← D(S) denotes sampling x ∈ S according to D. We let U(S) denote the uniform distribution on S. If D(·) is a probabilistic algorithm, y ← D(x) denotes running D on input x and assigning the output to y. In addition, the statistical distance between two distributions X and Y over a countable domain D is defined as (X , Y ) = 1 2 d∈D |X (d) − Y (d)|. If this statistical distance is negl(n), we say that these two distributions are statistically indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈ s Y . For any probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm A used to distinguish X and Y , if |Pr[A(1 n , X ) = 1] − Pr[A(1 n , X ) = 1]| is negl(n), we say these two distributions are computationally indistinguishable, denoted by X ≈ c Y . 
B. LATTICES
The minimum distance of a lattice is the length (in the Euclidean 2 norm) of its shortest nonzero vector: λ 1 ( ) = min 0 =x∈ x . For any vector x ∈ Z m , we let dist(x, ) denote the minimum 2 norm distance between x and .
For any basis B = {b 1 , . . . , b m } ⊂ R m consisting of m linearly independent vectors, we letB = {b 1 , . . . ,b m } denote its Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, defined iteratively in the following way:b 1 = b 1 , and for each i = 2, . . . , m,b i is the component of b i orthogonal to span(b 1 , . . . , b i ).
For an m-dimensional lattice , we define its dual lattice as * = {x ∈ R m : ∀v ∈ , x, v ∈ Z}.
Note that here we have ( * ) * = . In this paper, we focus on a special family of lattices, i.e., q-ary integer lattices. We say a lattice is a q-ary lattice if qZ m ⊆ ⊆ Z m for some integer q. Let A ∈ Z m×n q for some positive integers n, m, q, where n is the implicit security parameter and all other variables are functions of n; typically, m = m(n) is O(n log n), and modulus q = q(n) is some small polynomial, e.g., O(n 3 ). We consider two kinds of m-dimensional q-ary integer lattices defined by A.
The first lattice consists of those integer vectors that are ''orthogonal'' (modulo q) to the (transposed) rows of A, and is defined as
The second lattice is generated by the rows of A, and is defined as (A) = {y ∈ Z m : y = As mod q for some s ∈ Z n }.
It can be seen from the above two definitions that (A) and ⊥ (A) are dual in some sense:
C. LEARNING WITH ERRORS
As a generalization of the well-known learning parity with noise (LPN), learning with errors (LWE) is introduced by Regev in [27] and provides with a remarkably flexible tool for building cryptosystems due to its simplicity and provable security that solving the average-case LWE problem is at least as hard as solving some standard worst-case lattice problems. Now we reproduce the definition of the LWE problem in [27] . Definition 1 (LWE): Let n ≥ 1, q ≥ 2 be positive integers, X be an error distribution over Z q , and s be a secret vector following the uniform distribution over Z n q . Let A s,X denote the probability distribution over Z n q × Z q obtained by choosing a ∈ Z n q uniformly at random, choosing e ∈ Z q according to X , and returning the sample (a, c) = (a, a, s + e) ∈ Z n q × Z q . The LWE problem has two versions, the searchversion and the decision-version.
Search-LWE (SLWE) is to find s given access to arbitrarily many independent samples (a, c) = (a, a, s + e) from A s,X .
Decision-LWE (DLWE) is to distinguish an oracle that returns independent samples from A s,X from an oracle that returns independent samples from the uniform distribution on Z n q × Z q .
In [27] , Regev first showed a quantum reduction from worst-case lattice problems to the SLWE problem. Moreover, he also proved the equivalence between DLWE and SLWE using a sequence of elementary reductions, thus providing the underlying hardness for LWE-based constructions.
The LWE problem is characterized by three parameters: the modulus q, the dimension of the matrix n, and the error distribution X . X is usually taken to be a rounded continuous or discrete Gaussian distribution. The noise in LWE used initially by Regev [27] is the rounded Gaussian distribution, more recent papers [28] tend to use the discrete Gaussian distribution instead.
1) ROUNDED GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
For an integer q ≥ 1, Z q denotes the quotient ring Z/qZ. We let T = R/Z denote the group of reals [0, 1) with modulo 1 addition. For any β ∈ R + , ψ β denotes the distribution on T of a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation β/ √ 2π , reduced modulo 1. The discretization of ψ β is defined asψ β : Z q → R + that is the discrete distribution over Z q of the random variable q · X ψ β mod q, where X ψ β has the distribution ψ β .
Note that the width parameter of the rounded continuous Gaussianψ β used in [27] is specified by βq, andψ β has the shape of a discrete Gaussian centered around 0 with standard deviation σ = βq √ 2π
. In addition, its corresponding parameters are set as q = poly(n) and β ∈ (0, 1) such that βq ≥ 2 √ n, which help to obtain the reduction from GapSVP (or SIVP) to the SLWE problem. Now we recall a basic fact onψ β , which is usually applied to the correctness proofs of LWE-based constructions.
Lemma 1 ( [29] , Lemma 12) : Let β > 0 and q ∈ Z, and let x ∈ Z n be an arbitrary vector and y ←ψ n β , then with overwhelming probability over the choice of y,
As a special case, if x = y ←ψ n β , then | y, y | = y 2 < y · βq · ω( √ log n) + y · √ n/2, thus we have y < βq · ω( √ log n) + √ n/2 with all but negligible probability in n.
2) DISCRETE GAUSSIAN DISTRIBUTION
We refer to [30] , the discrete Gaussian distribution on Z with mean 0 and width parameter s is denoted by D Z,s , which assigns to each x ∈ Z a probability proportional to exp(−π x 2 /s 2 ), normalized by the factor S = 1 + 2 ∞ k=1 exp(−πk 2 /s 2 ). That is
Note that sampling an m-dimensional vector from the distribution D Z m ,s can be done by sampling each coefficient from the above 1-dimensional discrete Gaussian D Z m ,s with parameter s. Generally, we also use the following notations. For any real number s > 0, we define the Gaussian function on R m centered at c with parameter s as:
We can extend the above definition to an m-dimensional lattice . For any c ∈ R m , the discrete Gaussian distribution over is defined as:
In this paper, the discrete Gaussian we used is the form of D Z m ,s . However, for a proper s, we can efficiently sample from D Z m ,s in polynomial time according to the following lemma. Moreover, a new lattice parameter called smoothing parameter was introduced in [27] . It provides the width beyond which the discrete Gaussian measure on a lattice behaves like a continuous one.
Definition 2 ([27], Definition 2.10): For an m-dimensional lattice
and positive real > 0, we define the smoothing parameter η ( ) to be the smallest s > 0 such that [32] and [33] , we need the following two lemmas both regarding to η ( ), to prove the smoothness and correctness of our HPS in Section IV, respectively. Lemma 3 ( [32] , implicit in Lemma 3.5): For any m-dimensional lattice and any real > 0,
. Lemma 4.4) : For any m-dimensional lattice , c ∈ R m , real ∈ (0, 1) and s ≥ η ( ), we have
Then for any function ω(
√ log m), there is a negligible (m) for which η ( ) ≤ ω( √ log m)/λ 1 ( * ). Lemma 4 ( [33],Pr x←D ,s,c [ x − c > s √ m] ≤ 1 + 1 − · 2 −m .
D. HASH PROOF SYSTEM
Hash proof system (HPS) was first proposed by Cramer and Shoup [1] , which can be viewed as a special non-interactive zero-knowledge proof system for a language. Generally speaking, HPS consists of two components, i.e., projective hash family and subset membership problems. Note that in this paper, we require that this projective hash family has the smoothness property and its underlying subset membership problem is computationally hard.
1) PROJECTIVE HASH FAMILY
Let X and denote two finite, non-empty sets, and let H = (H k ) k∈K be a collection of functions indexed by k, so that for each k ∈ K , H k is a hash function from X into . Now we set H = (H , K , X , L, , S, α), where L is a non-empty and proper subset of X , S is a finite and non-empty set, α denotes a function mapping from K to S. We call H = (H , K , X , L, , S, α) a projective hash family for (X , L), if for all k ∈ K , the action of H k on L is determined by α(k).
Furthermore, if we hope this projective hash family H (for (X , L)) is smooth, we also need two other random variables U (H) = (x, s, π ) and V (H) = (x, s, π), where the probability space is defined by choosing x ∈ X \ L, k ∈ K , and π ∈ at random, and setting s = α(k) and π = H k (x).
Definition 3 (Smoothness, [1] Definition 3): Let
Roughly speaking, a projective hashing family is a family of hash functions which can be evaluated in two ways: using the (secret) hashing key, one can compute the function on every point in its domain, whereas using the (public) projected key one can only compute the function on a special subset of its domain. Such a family is deemed smooth if the hash function value on any point outside the special subset is independent of the projected key. Now we need a corresponding subset membership problem M for the final smooth HPS, which provides a class of languages with the computational indistinguishability between L and X \ L.
2) SUBSET MEMBERSHIP PROBLEM
A subset membership problem M specifies a collection (I n ) n≥0 of instance distributions, where I n denotes a probability distribution of instance descriptions for a specific security parameter n ≥ 0. An instance description, denoted by [X , L, W , R], specifies finite, non-empty sets X , L and W such that a language L ⊆ X and an efficiently computable binary relation R ⊂ X × W . Here w is a witness of x if for x ∈ X and w ∈ W with the relation (x, w) ∈ R. In addition, if and only if x ∈ L, we always have (x, w) ∈ R for some w ∈ W . We say a subset membership problem is hard if it is computationally hard to distinguish ( , x) from ( , y), where [X , L, W , R] is randomly sampled from I n , x and y are randomly sampled from L and X \ L, respectively.
3) SMOOTH HASH PROOF SYSTEM
Now we can obtain a smooth HPS for a subset membership problem M which associates a smooth projective hash family
For the consistency with the description of our concrete HPS scheme in Section IV, here we let H = (H , SK , C, V , K , PK , µ) denote such an smooth projective hash family as defined above, where SK , C, V , K and PK are finite, non-empty sets, and V ⊆ C be a language such that any c ∈ C can be efficiently sampled with a witness w ∈ {0, 1} * . For each sk ∈ SK , H sk is a hash function from C to K , and µ denotes a projection mapping from SK to PK . The projective property of this smooth projective hash family H implies that for any c ∈ V , we have H sk (c) = H pk (c, w), where w is a witness of c ∈ V and pk = µ(sk). In addition, for the smooth property of H, we need two additional variables u(H) = (c , pk, k ) and v(H) = (c , pk, k), where the probability space is defined by choosing c ∈ V = C \ V , sk ∈ SK , and k ∈ K at random, and setting pk = µ(sk) and k = H sk (c ), with requiring that u(H) and v(H) are statistically close, i.e., u(H) ≈ s v(H). It implies that for any c ∈ V = C \ V , the value H sk (c ) is independent of pk = µ(sk). Now the corresponding subset membership problem M provides the property that given a finite and non-empty set C and a language V ⊆ C, it is computationally hard to distinguish between random elements chosen from V and random elements chosen
Now we follow the form of HPS introduced in [25] , where HPS is viewed as a KEM scheme. That is to say, this KEM scheme (also called key transporting mechanism (KTM)) can be directly derived from an HPS scheme, where the sender encapsules and transmits an ephemeral session key k into a ciphertext c using the receiver's public key pk through k = H pk (c, w), the receiver can recover the same session key from this ciphertext using k = H sk (c) with his secret key sk.
Using the above definition of smooth projective hash family and subset membership problem, we can obtain an HPS consisting of three algorithms, HPS.param, HPS.pub, and HPS.priv. Note that in the context of KEM, C can be viewed as the set of all ciphertexts, V as the set of all valid ciphertexts, V as the set of all invalid ciphertexts, and K as the set of all symmetric keys.
• HPS.param(1 n ). Given a security parameter n as input, output (group, K ,
where group may contain some public parameters and V = C \ V .
• HPS.pub(pk, c, w). Take as inputs a public key pk = µ(sk) and a valid ciphertext c ∈ V with its witness w, then output k = H pk (c, w).
• HPS.priv(sk, c). Take as inputs a secret key sk ∈ SK and a ciphertext c ∈ C, then output k = H sk (c).
Moreover, the correctness of this system requires that for a valid ciphertext c ∈ V , the outputs of HPS.pub and HPS.priv should be the same with overwhelming probability for all randomness. This HPS is smooth if for all possible outputs from HPS.param(1 n ), its underlying projective hash function is -smooth with a negligible function (n). In addition, the underlying subset membership problem in the above HPS provides the property that two random ciphertexts c 0 ∈ V and c 1 ∈ V are computationally indistinguishable, where C, V and V are outputs from HPS.param(1 n ).
E. SOME RELATED LEMMAS
To build a smooth HPS as defined in Section II-D, we have to guarantee that the scheme we build can satisfy three requirements, i.e., the hardness of underlying subset membership problem, the complete correctness, and the smoothness property. For the clarity of the proofs we made for our HPS construction in Section IV, we need to recall some related lemmas here.
In order to prove the hardness of the underlying subset membership problem regarding to our HPS, we need a version of Goldreich-Levin theorem over Z q [34] . It implies that if the function f is roughly 1/q 2 -hard to invert by PPT algorithms, then y, s is pseudorandom even given f (s) and y.
To show the smoothness of our HPS, we need to know the other two important facts on q-ary lattices. 
III. LWE-BASED KEY EXCHANGE FOR ARBITRARY MODULUS
In this section, we first extend the LWE-based key exchange protocol (called Frodo) proposed in [24] for arbitrary modulus in Section III-A, whose behind reconciliation mechanism will be applied to an LWE-based HPS scheme [14] , thus improving its original efficiency. In addition, we show the security and correctness of this extended key exchange in Section III-B and III-C, respectively. In Frodo, there are two participants, i.e., Alice and Bob, which intend to agree a shared session key by interacting with each other. The strategy behind this scheme (mainly similar to Figure 1 ) is to combine Alice'sn LWE instances and Bob's m LWE instances somehow to compute their own secrete matrices V ∈ Zm ×n q and B S ∈ Zm ×n q , respectively. Each of entry in V is approximately equal to the corresponding entry in B S, thus B bits can be extracted from each entry of matrix to form the final shared session key. To guarantee that the same shared key can be obtained from both sides, Bob has to send a signal information C ∈ Zm ×n 2 to ensure the exact key bits can be recovered by Alice.
However, sometimes a power of two modulus is not the case, for instance, it is often desirable to let modulus q be a sufficiently large prime for efficiency and security reasons. For addressing this issue, we introduce two additional functions (i.e., Fac(·, ·) and Find(·, ·)) and accordingly modify our reconciliation mechanism to show that Frodo can be adapted for arbitrary modulus (see Figure 1 ).
As seen in Algorithm 1, the function Fac : Z × Z → Z takes q (modulus) and B (the bit-length of key) as inputs,
3:
x ← i 4:
end if 7: end for 8 : return x and outputs f by invoking its implicit function Find : Z × Z → Z (see Algorithm 2) during execution. Note that this f will be used by Rand(·, ·) for the extending factor 2 f . Similar to [26] , we define our randomized function as Rand : Z × Z q → Z 2 f q that takes f and v ∈ Z q as inputs and outputsv
Here Fac(·, ·) is used to find a precise extending factor 2 f , which helps to remove unnecessary overhead caused by simply using Rand(B, v) for the corresponding reconciliation mechanism working well via Z 2 f q . Now we define the rounding function as
while the crossing rounding function as defined by
As shown in the above, our reconciliation mechanism works via Z 2 f q . Now we divide Z 2 f q := {0, . . . , 2 f q − 1} into 2 B · 2 intervals. Such an interval is denoted by I i,j , where i = · 2 B ∈ {0, . . . , 2 B − 1} and j = · 2 B ∈ {0, 1}. That is, · 2 B partitions Z 2 f q into 2 B intervals of integers, i.e., I i for all i ∈ {0, . . . , 2 B − 1}. · 2 B further divides each I i into two subsets I i,0 and I i,1 , thus dividing Z 2 f q into two large subsets I j for all j ∈ {0, 1}. Note that |I 0,0 | = |I 1,0 | = . . . = |I 2 B−1 ,0 | = 2 f q 2 B+1 and |I 0,1 | = |I 1,1 | = . . . = |I 2 B−1 ,1 | = 2 f q 2 B+1 . By Claim 1, we can show that v 2 B is uniformly random given v 2 B for uniformly distributedv.
Accordingly, we define the reconciliation function rec :
where
This reconciliation function guarantees that if v, w ∈ Z q are sufficient close, then we can recover v 2 B given w and v 2 B .
Proof: We assume that w = v + e mod q for some small e, then 2 f w = 2 f v + 
The claim follows by the correctness shown in Section III-C.
Note that the above adapted reconciliation mechanism also works on each entry of matrices. Therefore, the derived keys K a and K b are the same and bothmnB bit-length. In addition, we let X be the discrete Gaussian distribution D Z,s as defined in Section II-C. As shown in Figure 1 , our key exchange protocol keeps using Algorithm 1 and 2 and runs as following:
Alice's TODO: Alice first generates public matrix A from a small random seed A ∈ {0, 1} s via a pseudo-random function Gen. 1 Alice independently chooses each entry of S and E according to error distribution X over Z n×n q . Then she computes her public LWE instances matrix B using A, S and E, and sends seed A and B to Bob.
Bob's TODO: Bob also generates public matrix A by running Gen(seed A ), and chooses each entry of S and E independently according to error distribution X over Zm ×n q . Then he computes his public LWE instances matrix B by 1 One benefit is that using a new A per connection can avoid ''all-for-theprice-of-one'' precomputation attacks [23] . The benefit in the other hand is that this approach can significantly save bandwidth when the common scenario that the global parameter A is chosen by Alice then sent to Bob happens. using A, S and E . Bob combines Alice's public matrix B and his secrete matrix S with a new error matrix E (each entry chosen independently according to X over Zm ×n q ) to form a matrix V, then he extends V toV using functions Fac and Rand sequentially. ThisV is taken as the key material from which the session key K b is derived by invoking · 2 B onV. In addition, Bob has to compute a signal matrix C = V 2 B , and sends it with B to Alice.
Alice's TODO: After receiving B and C, Alice first runs Fac to find f , and invokes rec on the inputs 2 f B S and C to generate session key K a .
B. SKETCH OF SECURITY PROOF
Similar to [24] , this extended key exchange protocol relies on the hardness of a matrix form of the DLWE problem with short secrets, by a tight reduction (referring to [35] u) . The DLWE problem (with short secrets) for (n, q, X ) is to distinguish O X ,s from U . For an algorithm A to solve the DLWE problem, we define its advantage as Adv dlwe−ss n,q,X = |Pr(s ← X (Z n q ) : A O X ,s () = 1) − Pr(A U () = 1)|. An important fact is that DLWE becomes no easier to solve even if s is chosen from the error distribution X , rather than uniformly at random (Referring to [35] Lemma 2 and [28] Section 2). This reduction is reproduced in [24] , we recall it as following:
Lemma 10 ( [24] , DLWE to DLWE With Short Secrets): If A is a distinguishing algorithm for DLWE with short secrets, it can be used to construct a distinguishing algorithm B for original DLWE (with s chosen from uniform distribution) running in roughly the same time as A, with B making O(n 2 ) calls to its oracle, and satisfying Adv dlwe n,q,X (B) = Adv dlwe−ss n,q,X (A). Note that Lemma 10 requires a prime power modulus, however, by Lemma 11 which essentially subsumes all of the prior SLWE to DLWE reductions (including Lemma 10), we can extend the above lemma for arbitrary modulus.
Lemma 11 ([36] Theorem 3.1): Let q have prime factorization q = q e 1 1 · · · q e k k for pairwise distinct poly(n)-bounded primes q i with each e i ≥ 1, and let 0 < β ≤ ω( √ log n) 2 Let be the number of prime factors q i < ω( √ log n)/β. There is a probabilistic polynomial-time reduction from solving SLWE q,β (in the worst case, with overwhelming probability) 2 In [36] , they use a ''randomized-rounding parameter'' r that they let be a fixed function r(n) = ω( √ log n) growing asymptotically faster than √ log n. By ''fixed function'', they mean that r = √ log n always refers to the very same function, and no other factors will be absorbed into the ω(·) notation. to solving DLWE q,α (on the average, with non-negligible advantage) for any α ≥ β such that α ≥ ω( √ log n)/q e i i for every i, and (α) ≥ βω( √ log n) +1 . Actually, the exact security proof of our key exchange protocol needs a matrix form of this DLWE with short secrets (referring to [24] ''Matrix form''). With this matrix form of DLWE with short secrets problem, the subsequent security proof is mainly similar to that of [24] . Therefore, we choose to skip these parts, and recommend readers to refer to Section 5.2 in [24] for a detailed treatment.
C. CORRECTNESS OF THE SCHEME
Here we let error distribution X be discrete Gaussian distribution on Z with mean zero and parameter s, denoted by D Z,s . In this subsection we show a brief argument as to why our key exchange protocol in Figure 1 is indeed correct. As shown in Section II-C, Proposition 1: If two parities honestly execute the protocol in Figure 1 , the probability that the two derived keys are not the same is negl(n) (e.g., less than 1/2 80 ) ifmn < n and B ≤ o(log q).
Proof: As shown in Figure 1 , the shared key is derived from two approximate matrices 2 f B S andV in both sides. We denote each entry of B S (resp. V) by w i (resp. v i ), where i ∈ [1,mn] . In each entry, we assume that w i = v i + e i . Thus, we have 2 f w i = 2 f v i + 2 f e i =v i +ē i + 2 f e i =v i +ê i , whereê i =ē i +2 f e i . Therefore, the reconciliation mechanism that derives K a and K b from 2 f B S = 2 f (AS + E )S and V = Rand(f , S (AS + E) + E ) can only produce K a = K b if there is at least one entry such that |v i − 2 f w i | ≥ 2 f q 2 B+2 . However, based on the following analysis, the probability of
. For example, we let i = 1 and have |e 1 | = |v 1 − w 1 | = |(s 11 e 11 + s 12 e 21 + . . . + s 1n e n1 + e 11 ) − (e 11 s 11 + e 12 s 21 + . . . + e 1n s n1 )| = | s 1 , e 1 − e 1 , s 1 + e 11 |, where s 1 (resp. e 1 ) denotes the first row in matrix S (resp. E ) and e 1 (resp. s 1 ) denotes the first column in matrix E (resp. S). We can rewrite |e 1 | = |v 1 − w 1 | = | s 1 , e 1 − e 1 , s 1 + e 11 | = | s 1 , e 1 + e 1 ,s 1 + e 11 |, wheres 1 ands 1 are used to denote the appropriate reorderrings (and sign changes when necessary) of the s 1 and s 1 , respectively. Furthermore, we can view |e 1 | = |v 1 −w 1 | = | s 1 , e 1 + e 1 ,s 1 +e 11 | as the form of | s,ẽ + e 11 | = |s 1ẽ1 + . . . +s 2nẽ2n + e 11 |, wheres and e are two 2n-dimensional vectors. Since e 11 ∈ Z q , we have |e 1 | ≤ |s 1ẽ1 | + . . . + |s 2nẽ2n | + |e 11 e 11 |. We can see that there are 2n + 1 terms in this sum, then at least one of this term should be larger than q−2 B+1 2 B+2 (2n+1) . Since such a term is the form of an ''error square'', at least one of thes,ẽ (i.e., e, e , s, s ) or indeed e must exceed z =
2 B+2 (2n+1) in absolute value. We define the upper bound of z as z u = z and the lower bound of z as z l = z . Thus, the probability of an individual coefficient exceeding z u in absolute value is equal to 2 ∞ x=z u D Z,s (x). Since the probability that at least one of the 2n + 1 terms exceeds z is bounded by the sum of all 2n + 1 individual probabilities (of each coefficient exceeding z u ), we have
. Similarly, the probability that at least one coefficient of K a and K b disagree is clearly bounded above by the sum of the all the P i for i ∈ [1,mn], so we have
As an upper bound on the sum on the right hand side, we use the integral
where erfc is the complementary error function. Referring to Theorem 1 and Corollary 1 in [37] , we obtain that erfc(z l ) ≤ e −z 2 l . Overall, we get that
Usually, we take S ≈ s, then we have = 2 log(mn(2n+1)) · e −(z 2
IV. LWE-BASED SMOOTH HASH PROOF SYSTEM
In this section, we apply the extended reconciliation mechanism shown in Section III to an efficient LWE-based HPS [14] . We show that our proposed LWE-based HPS achieves a better performance (see Table 1 ) when comparing to other related works. This improved LWE-based HPS consists of the following three algorithms HPS.param, HPS.pub and HPS.priv: q, m, B, A, β, s) , where q = q(n) is a prime modulus, m = 2n log q is the dimension of the underlying lattice, and B < log n−5 2 is the bit-length of the encapsulated key. In addition, A is uniformly random matrix in Z m×n q , β ∈ (0, 1) and s = √ qω( √ log m) are two real numbers such that βq ≥ 2 √ n and β ≤ √ 2π /(s √ m · ω( √ log n)).
• SK is the distribution D Z m ,s over Z m , PK = Z n q . • For a random sk := v ← D Z m ,s , we define pk := y = µ(sk) = A T v mod q. HPS.pub(pk, c, w) : For a valid ciphertext c := (As + e mod q, z 2 B ) with a witness w := (s ∈ Z n q ,z ∈ Z 2 f q ) such that x − As ≤ βqω( √ log m) + √ m/2 andz − 2 f z ∈ Z 2 f , we compute and output k = z 2 B as the encapsulated key.
HPS.priv(sk, c) : For a ciphertext c := (x, b) and secret key sk := v, we compute z = v, x mod q and choose e ← U(Z 2 f ). The output of rec (2 f z + e , b) is taken as the encapsulated key.
Note that in the above HPS scheme, we apply a variant of rec(·, ·) (see Equation 3 ), which is defined as 3 Note that if q is an odd prime, then f = B when running Rand(·, ·).
where e ← U(
This reconciliation function guarantees that if z, z ∈ Z q are sufficient close, we can recover z 2 B given z , e and b = z 2 B . Therefore, we have this following Claim 3, whose proof is similar to Claim 2.
Note that for s = √ qω( √ log m) ≥ √ log m, the distribution D Z m ,s can be efficiently sampled in polynomial time according to the description of Lemma 2. And all other sets in our new HPS can be efficiently sampled as well. Thus all above evaluations in above HPS can be done efficiently.
Moreover, we rephrase the above HPS as a KEM scheme (see Figure 2 ), which is defined as KEM = (KEM.Kg, KEM.Enc, KEM.Dec) with key space K : via (pk, sk) ← KEM.Kg(1 n ), the randomized key generation algorithm produces public and secret keys for security parameter n ∈ N; via (k b , c) ← KEM.Enc(pk), the sender Bob uses the randomized encapsulation algorithm to produce a uniformly distributed key k b ∈ K together with a ciphertext c under the receiver's public key pk; via k a ← KEM.Dec(sk, c), the receiver Alice recovers the ephemeral session key through decrypting c using her secret key sk. The correctness of KEM guarantees that k a = k b .
Theorem 1: Let n be the security parameter, and q ≥ 2 B+3 sm be an odd prime. We further set B < log n−5
Then the above HPS is smooth under the DLWE assumption.
Proof: The complete proof of this theorem is split into three parts, i.e., the computational hardness of subset membership problem (see Lemma 12) , correctness (see Lemma 13) and smoothness (see Lemma 14) .
Lemma 12 (Hardness of Subset Membership Problem): For the parameter setting of Theorem 1, the underlying subset membership problem in our HPS is computationally hard.
Proof: We first recall the notion of subset membership problem in the above HPS. Given a random matrix A sampled from Z m×n
The goal is to prove the (computational) indistinguishability between the distributions of V and V .
The proof is divided into steps: first, we show a valid ciphertext (As + e mod q, z 2 B ) is computationally indistinguishable with the one (As + e mod q, b) , where b is chosen randomly from {0, 1}. That is, (As + e mod q, z 2 B ) ≈ c (As + e mod q, b) .
Then, for an invalid ciphertext (As + e mod q, b ) sampled from V , i.e., s ← Z n q , e ≥ √ q/4, b ← {0, 1}, we show the right side of Equation 4 is indistinguishable with (As + e mod q, b ), i.e., (As + e mod q, b) ≈ c (As + e mod q, b ).
To prove that Equation 4 is correct, we have to show z 2 B ≈ c b even given As + e mod q. First, we have that
As shown in Section III-A, if y, s mod q is uniformly distributed over Z q , so isz uniformly distributed over Z 2 f q , thus z 2 B is uniformly distributed. It turns to prove that the distribution of y, s mod q has to be indistinguishable with uniform distribution over Z q . According to Lemma 5, As + e mod q can be viewed as a hard irreversible function f relying on the hardness of SLWE (see Definition 1). Thus we can directly have y, s mod q ≈ c u, where u is uniformly distributed over Z q . Therefore, Equation 4 holds. Now we turn to prove Equation 5. Since b and b are both chosen uniformly random, we only prove
As + e mod q ≈ c As + e mod q.
Since any element As+e mod q in V is indistinguishable with a randomly chosen element over C := Z m q due to the hardness of DLWE, it implies that the distribution of As + e mod q should be indistinguishable with the distribution of any subset of C, e.g., V . Otherwise, we can build a distinguisher to solve the DLWE problem.
Actually, A can specify a q-ary lattice (A) = {y ∈ Z m : ∃s ∈ Z n q such that y = As mod q}. According to Lemma 1, As + e mod q in V is very close to the q-ary lattice (A) and its corresponding distance is e ≤ βqω( √ log m) + √ m/2. However, for the element As + e mod q in V is relatively far away from (A). Referring to Lemma 8, it implies that we can randomly choose x ← Z m q such that x ∈ V with overwhelming probability, i.e., x = As + e , where e ≥ √ q/4. Therefore, the distribution of choosing an element in V is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Z m q . Furthermore, due to the hardness of DLWE, the distribution of As + e mod q in V is computationally indistinguishable with the uniform distribution over Z m q . Thus Equation 6 holds. Therefore, the underlying subset membership problem of our HPS is computationally hard.
Note that here we obtain a weaker version of subset membership problem. That is, the set of invalid ciphertexts V is not the exact C \ V , it is indeed a subset of C \ V . However, the computational indistinguishability still holds between V and V without any impact on the security of our HPS.
Lemma 13 (Correctness): For the parameter setting of Theorem 1, our HPS is correct with overwhelming probability.
Proof: As shown in Figure 2 , the encapsulated key is generated by encapsulation encryption algorithm (k b , c) ← KEM.Enc(pk, w), i.e., k b = z 2 B . In the other side, this encapsulated key is recovered by private encapsulation decryption algorithm k a ← KEM.Dec(sk, c), i.e., k a = rec (2 f z + e , b), where z = v, x mod q and e ← U(Z 2 f ) (similar to the sampling method as choosingē).
The correctness of our HPS is guaranteed by proving k a = k b with overwhelming probability. Note that v, x mod q = ( v, x = As + e ) mod q = ( v, As + v, e ) mod q = ( y, s + v, e ) mod q (y = v T A mod q)
Because z = s T y mod q, we let z = z +ẽ, whereẽ = e T v.
Then we have 2 f z + e = 2 f z + 2 fẽ + e =z +ē + 2 fẽ + e . Therefore, since we have k a = k b , it implies that |z −
. By the triangle inequality, we have |ẽ| − 1 ≤ |ẽ ± 1| ≤ |ẽ| + 1. If we can show that the probability of (|ẽ| + 1) < q 2 B+2 is overwhelming, then we can prove that the probability of |ẽ ± 1| < q 2 B+2 is overwhelming. Therefore, we have to show that |ẽ| = |e T v| < q 2 B+2 − 1 with overwhelming probability, i.e., v, e is at distance at most q 2 B+2 − 1 from 0.
Moreover, we know that v ← D Z m ,s , then it holds that v ≤ s √ m except with exponentially small probability by Lemma 4. According to the definition ofψ β , for all i ∈ [m], e i = q · t i mod q, where the t i are independent normal variables with mean 0 and variance β 2 /2π . Thus we have e−t ≤ √ m/2. In addition, by Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, v, e is at most sm/2 ≤ q/2 B+3 (where q ≥ 2 B+2 sm) away from q v, t mod 1. Therefore, it suffices to show that | v, t | ≤ 1 2 B+2 − 1/q − 1 2 B+3 (we let q ≥ 2 B+2 sm) with overwhelming probability. Because all t i s are independent, v, t is distributed as a normal variable with mean 0 and standard deviation
). Now we recall the tail inequality on normal variable v, t ,
).
In this case, we let t · σ = 1 2 B+3 − 1/q and σ = 1/ √ 2n, then t = √ 2n · ( 1 2 B+3 − 1/q). It is clear that the probability of
. Therefore, the probability of | v, e | < q 2 B+2 − 1 is negligible. We've done the proof for correctness.
Lemma 14 (Smoothness): For the parameter setting of Theorem 1, our HPS is smooth.
Proof: To show the smoothness of our HPS, we have to prove that for any (x, b) ∈ V , the output of encapsulation decryption algorithm k = rec (2 f x T v+e mod q, b) is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Z 2 B even given (x, pk). According to the definition of randomized rec (·, ·) described in Claim 3, it suffices to prove that the distribution of v, x mod q is statistically close to uniform.
For an invalid ciphertext c := (x = As + e, b) ∈ V , we know that dist(x, (A)) is larger than √ q/4 according to Lemma 8. Therefore, it holds that for every non-zero a ∈ Z q , dist(a · x, (A)) > √ q/4 by Lemma 9. If we set A = (A, x) , by Lemma 9, it implies that λ 1 (A ) > √ q/4. In addition, relying on Lemma 3 and the dual properties of q-ary lattices ⊥ (A ) and (A ), we have η ( ⊥ (A )) ≤ ω( √ ( log m))/( 1 q λ 1 ( (A ))) ≤ √ qω( √ log m). Then by Lemma 6 and 7, we obtain that for v ← D Z m ,s with s ≥ √ qω( √ log m), the distribution of u = (A ) T v mod q is within a negligible distance of the uniform distribution over Z m q . It implies that for any (x, b) ∈ V , we get
where u is uniformly chosen from Z q . It means that given public key y = A T v and any element x ∈ V , v, x is still statistical close to the uniform distribution. Therefore, our HPS is smooth and the proof for Theorem 1 is complete.
1) EFFICIENCY COMPARISON
In [14] , they already made a comparison between their work with other existing HPS schemes built upon lattice problems, i.e., [2] , [38] . Here we recall their efficiency comparison in our Then we can run the sequential steps as described in [14] to derive a B-bit key. However, this simple method will bring some heavy overhead when comparing with our HPS proposed in this paper. Therefore, we compare our HPS scheme (see Table 1 ) with the original HPS of [14] and its extended version (for B-bit key), to show that our HPS can achieve a better efficiency than the simple extension of [14] . We let n denote the common security parameter, and m is a function of n, e.g., m = n log q. To count the number (denoted by ) of arithmetic operations during the courses of HPS.pub and HPS.priv, we let a and m represent a single multiplication and addition over Z q , respectively. In addition, we let |k| denote the bit-length of the encapsulated key k, as well as |pk|, |sk| and |c|.
V. TWO EXTENSIONS: IB-HPS AND UHPS
Based on the improved HPS in Section IV, we further extend it into the identity-based setting and make it updatable to be secure against continual leakage, i.e., identity-based HPS (IB-HPS) and updatable HPS (UHPS).
A. IB-HPS
Based on the HPS construction in Section IV, we can extend it into an identity-based HPS (IB-HPS). Note that the identity set ID substitutes the place of PK in our HPS, and the corresponding secret key sk id for each id ∈ ID and ciphertext c ∈ C are sampled in a very different way. Moreover, in this IB-HPS, we also need two additional tools: one is a random oracle H : {0, 1} * → Z n q which is used to map identity id to an integer vector over Z n q ; the other tool we need is the preimage sampleable function presented in [31] , which is indexed by the matrix A ∈ Z m×n q and denoted by f A : Z m q → Z n q , i.e., mapping a vector x ∈ Z m q to f A (x) = A T x. Note that if this x is chosen from D Z m ,s for a sufficient large s, then y = f A (x) is statistically close to the uniform distribution over Z n q . In addition, it is implied by Lemma 2 that an efficient probabilistic algorithm SampleISIS exists. For any random variables e ← D Z m ,s and y ← Z n q , this SampleISIS can help to find a preimage of y in f −1 A (x) using the trapdoor matrix T ∈ Z m×m such that
[(e, f A (e)), (SampleISIS(y), y)] ≤ negl(n).
This IB-HPS consists of the following five PPT algorithms (Setup, KeyGen, Encap, Encap * , Decap):
• Setup(1 n ): Generate a matrix A ∈ Z m×n q together with its trapdoor matrix T ∈ Z m×m by running a proper trapdoor sampling algorithm (e.g., [39] ). Output the master public key mpk := A and the master secret key msk := T. (4z + e , b) , where z = v, x mod q and e ← Z 2 f . Similar to Theorem 1, we can obtain the following theorem.
Theorem 2: Let n be the security parameter, and q ≥ 2 B+3 sm be an odd prime. We further set B < log n−5 2 , m = 2n log q, s = √ qω( √ log m), and 2 √ n/q ≤ β ≤ √ 2π/(s √ 2mn). Then the above IB-HPS is smooth under the DLWE assumption in the random oracle model.
Proof: Due to the large similarity between the proof of Theorem 2 and that of Theorem 1, we skip the proof here. However, we note that when we show the hardness of its underlying subset membership problem, an additional reduction is needed after using Goldreich-Levin theorem (see Lemma 5), i.e., a black-box reduction from an efficient DLWE distinguisher B to any efficient distinguisher A between valid and invalid ciphertexts. We recommend the readers to read [14] for a detailed treatment.
B. UPDATABLE HPS
As far as we know, HPS can be used to construct leakageresistant encryption schemes directly. However, previous constructions can be only adopted in relative leakage model [6] , [40] and bound leakage model [41] . Using the reconciliation mechanism mentioned in Section III, we can achieve an improved updatable HPS (UHPS) on the basis of the UHPS scheme presented in [14] , which is secure against continual leakage by taking advantage of Gaussian sampling algorithm to refresh the secret key in a secure way. It is defined as UHPS = (UHPS.Param, UHPS.Pub, UHPS.Priv, UHPS.KeyUpd),
consisting of the following four efficient algorithms: UHPS.param(1 n ): Output the instance (group, K , C, V , V , PK , SK , H (·) : C → K , µ : SK → PK ), where q, m, B, A, T, β, s) , where q = q(n) is a prime modulus, m = 2n log q is the dimension of the underlying lattice, and B < log n−5 2 is the bit-length of the encapsulated key. β ∈ (0, 1) and s = √ qω( √ log m) are two real numbers such that βq ≥ 2 √ n and β ≤ √ 2π /s √ m·ω( √ log n). Run the trapdoor sampling algorithm (e.g., [39] ) to generate A ∈ Z m×n q together with a trapdoor T ∈ Z m×m , where the distribution of A is statistically close to uniform over Z m×n q and T = O( √ n log q).
• SK is the distribution D Z m ,s over Z m , PK = Z n q . • For a random sk := v ← D Z m ,s , we define pk := y = µ(sk) = A T v mod q. Proof: We omit the proof here since it mainly follows the proof of Theorem 1.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we first extend the reconciliation mechanism of an LWE-based key exchange protocol for arbitrary modulus, then we apply this technique to improve an efficient LWE-based HPS scheme, thus outputting multiple bits. We show that our lattice-based HPS proposal can perform better than other related works. In addition, we present two extensions of our HPS scheme to show its potential uses in different settings, i.e., an identity-based HPS (IB-HPS) and an updatable HPS (UHPS).
Although our HPS scheme is efficient, it can only achieve approximate correctness. However, in [15] , the authors have shown the way to amplify the approximately correct HPS scheme into a statistically correct one. Whether their result still works in our proposal is still a question. And how to make our HPS scheme to be word-independent also requires some further research. In addition, a new result [42] has been proposed to show a similar reconciliation mechanism as the one used in this paper, but instantiated with learning with rounding (LWR) problems. Another direction of our future work is to build an LWR-based HPS scheme by referring to the result shown in this paper. It would contribute to the course of developing post-quantum cryptosystems.
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